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On July 25, 2013, Distribuidora de Discos Karen C. por A. 
(“DDK”) and its Florida affiliates and licensees Karen Records 
Inc. and Karen Publishing Company (collectively, “plaintiffs”) 
filed this action against Juan Luis Guerra Seijas (“Guerra”), 
alleging copyright infringement and various state-law claims.  
In late 2013, Guerra moved to dismiss or stay the case under 
the Colorado River abstention doctrine1 or, in the alternative, 
to transfer to the Southern District of Florida.  While that 
motion was pending, we solicited supplemental submissions from 
the parties addressing whether the complaint against Guerra 
adequately alleged copyright infringement, the sole claim upon 
                                                 
1 Colo. River Water Conserv. Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976). 
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which our subject-matter jurisdiction rested.2  On May 6, 2014, 
the day after filing their supplemental submission, plaintiffs 
sought leave to file a motion to amend the complaint to replace 
their copyright infringement claim with one for 
misrepresentation under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.3  
See 17 U.S.C. § 512(f).  We granted plaintiffs’ motion, and 
plaintiffs amended their complaint to state a DMCA claim and to 
add Guerra’s attorney, Alexander Hartnett, as a second 
defendant.  See Am. Compl., ECF No. 22. 
Defendant have now moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint 
for failure to state a claim under subsection 512(f).  For the 
reasons set forth below, we deny defendant’s motion. 
BACKGROUND 
 
I. The Agreements Between the Parties 
 
Between 1985 and 1992, Guerra, an international recording 
artist based in the Dominican Republic, entered into a series 
of agreements with DDK, a Dominican record company, under which 
DDK agreed to pay Guerra for certain rights to songs he 
promised to record.  Am. Compl. ¶¶ 14–27.  In 2006, Guerra and 
DDK entered into another agreement (the “2006 Agreement”), 
which released Guerra from his recording obligations and 
                                                 
2 DDK is incorporated in the Dominican Republic, and Guerra is a citizen of 
the Dominican Republic.  Thus, we have no diversity or alienage jurisdiction 
over this case. 
3 Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), 17 U.S.C. §§ 512, 1201–1332, 28 
U.S.C. § 4001. 
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established the parties’ ongoing rights relating to the songs 
that Guerra had already recorded.4  Id. ¶¶ 28–33. 
All parties agree that the copyrights in the sound 
recordings have always belonged to plaintiffs, and plaintiffs 
have included their copyright registrations in the Amended 
Complaint.  Id. ¶¶ 34-36; id., Ex. E; Tr. 8.5  However, Guerra 
contends the 2006 Agreement granted him “administration 
rights,” including the right to license the use of the songs 
and to collect publishing/songwriting royalties from licensees, 
beginning in October 2009.  Def. Br. on First Mot. to Dismiss 
4, ECF No. 5; Tr. 4-9.  Plaintiffs dispute this interpretation, 
contending that the 2006 Agreement granted defendant no such 
rights.  Tr. 13. 
II. The Florida Action 
 
On June 20, 2011, more than two years before plaintiffs 
filed this case, Guerra filed an action in Florida against this 
case’s plaintiffs and their two principals, Bienvenido 
Rodriguez and Isabel Rodriguez.  See Compl., Guerra Seijas v. 
Karen Records, Inc., Case No. 11-18912 CA 22 (Fla. Cir. Ct., 
11th Cir.) (the “Florida Action”), filed herein at ECF No. 5-5.  
In that case, Guerra seeks an accounting of the royalty 
                                                 
4 Although the 1985-2006 agreements were entered into by DDK, the rights 
granted to it were also granted to Karen Records Inc. and Karen Publishing 
Company as DDK’s licensees.  See Am. Compl. ¶ 27. 
5 Citations to “Tr.” refer to the transcript of oral argument on Guerra’s 
first motion to dismiss, held on February 20, 2014. 
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revenues he is owed under the 2006 Agreement, damages for 
breach of contract, and a declaration of “the parties’ 
respective rights under the [2006] Release Agreement, including 
the ownership of the copyrights and rights to royalties.”  Am. 
Compl., Florida Action, filed herein at ECF Nos. 5-1 to 5-3.  
DDK and its affiliates have counterclaimed for fraudulent 
inducement and unjust enrichment, and are seeking monetary 
damages and rescission of the 2006 Agreement.  See Am. Answer, 
Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim, Florida Action, filed 
herein at ECF No. 5-6.  We are informed that the Circuit Court 
is currently considering dispositive motions. 
In addition to the Florida Action, there are two other 
cases currently being litigated between the parties.  One is 
before Judge Oetken in this District and the other is in the 
Dominican Republic.  Both have been stayed pending the Florida 
Action.  See Stip. & Joint Mot. to Hold Case in Abeyance, 
Distribuidora de Discos Karen C. por A. v. Universal Music 
Grp., Inc., 13-cv-7706 (JPO) (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 2014), ECF No. 
12; Hartnett Aff. ¶ 7, Def. Br. on First Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. B 
(ECF No. 5-4). 
III. Apple and iTunes 
 
Because it is relevant to the question of whether a 
federal claim exists, we begin by describing in some detail the 
allegations of how Apple conducts its iTunes business. 
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The Amended Complaint explains that the iTunes division of 
Apple Computers, Inc. (“Apple”), sells digital copies of songs 
to the public through the Internet.  Am. Compl. ¶ 78.  In order 
to sell music on iTunes, Apple licenses music from record 
labels and other entities.  See id. 
The Amended Complaint incorporates Apple’s contract with 
“Karen Records & Publishing Co.”6 (the “Apple Contract”) to sell 
music and music videos through iTunes.  See Apple Contract, Am. 
Compl., Ex. F.  This contract gives Apple non-exclusive rights 
for approximately three years (see Apple Contract § 1(k)) to: 
1) reproduce and format plaintiffs’ music and videos into 
versions compatible with Apple’s digital rights 
managemant systems; 
2) stream clips of plaintiffs’ music and videos in order to 
promote the sales of full songs; 
3) market, sell, and electronically distribute songs to 
iTunes customers; 
4) reproduce and deliver associated artwork, such as album 
cover art; and 
5) use plaintiffs’ copyrighted material “as may be 
reasonably necessary or desirable for [Apple] to 
                                                 
6 We assume at this stage that this refers to one of the plaintiffs.  For 
simplicity, we refer to Apple’s counterparty as “plaintiffs.” 
Case 1:13-cv-05200-NRB   Document 28   Filed 03/26/15   Page 5 of 22
   
 6
exercise [Apple’s] rights under the terms of this 
Agreement.” 
§ 2(a). 
After the Apple Contract’s effective date, plaintiffs were 
required to deliver “all existing COMPANY Content” as soon as 
reasonably possible.7  § 3(a).  Thereafter, plaintiffs were 
required to deliver all “just[-]cleared COMPANY Content and new 
releases . . . at least in time for [Apple] to begin selling 
[formatted copies] the earlier of a general release date . . . 
or when any other distributor is permitted to begin selling, or 
making commercially available, COMPANY Content in any format.”  
§ 3(a).  The Apple Contract granted Apple the right to choose 
whether to sell music as individual songs or as full albums.  
§ 3(b).  Apple reserved sole discretion to set retail prices, 
but promised five days’ notice before increasing such prices.  
§ 5.  Plaintiffs, meanwhile, were responsible for paying 
royalties (§ 4), selecting parental advisory warnings (§ 7), 
and providing any copyright notices (§ 10). 
Apple promised to remove plaintiffs’ music from iTunes on 
three days’ notice if plaintiffs (1) lost the rights to the 
music or (2) believed that Apple’s continued sale would harm 
                                                 
7 “COMPANY Content” was defined as “sound recordings owned or controlled by 
[plaintiffs] and in which [plaintiffs] ha[ve] cleared . . . the necessary 
rights to authorize electronic sales and sound recording performances by 
[Apple] pursuant to the terms of this Agreement.”  § 1(n). 
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plaintiffs’ relationships with copyright owners.  § 6(c).  
Separately, Apple reserved the right to unilaterally remove any 
content “in the event a third party claims that [Apple] is not 
authorized to sell or otherwise use such . . . Content or 
Artwork on the Online Store, in which case [plaintiffs] shall 
cooperate with [Apple’s] reasonable requests towards handling 
such third party claim.”  § 6(d). 
Apple permits third parties to submit such claims (or 
“take-down notices”) through an online form.  See Pl. Bf., Att. 
2, ECF No. 26-2.  Apple’s form explains that most iTunes 
content is provided by third-party providers, and that Apple 
will work with the content provider to resolve a dispute.  Id. 
at 1.  The form requires a rights-holder’s agent to submit his 
name, phone number, and email address, id. at 2, to list the 
disputed content, id. at 3–4, and to subscribe to the following 
statement: 
I represent that the information in this 
submission is accurate and swear under 
penalty of perjury that I am the owner or 
agent authorized to act on behalf of the 
owner of the content being disputed.  I have 
good faith belief that the disputed use is 
not authorized by the intellectual property 
owner, its agent, or the law. 
Id. at 5. 
In March 2013, Hartnett either sent Apple a letter (see 
Am. Compl. ¶ 37) or submitted a notice using Apple’s online 
Case 1:13-cv-05200-NRB   Document 28   Filed 03/26/15   Page 7 of 22
   
 8
form (see Pl. Bf. 4, ECF No. 26).  This communication related 
to songs that Guerra had recorded under the 1985–1992 
agreements, which were then being sold on iTunes pursuant to 
the Apple Contract.  Am. Compl. ¶ 37.  Hartnett’s communication 
stated: “I represent Juan Luis Guerra who is the publisher of 
the musical compositions on this release.  No license has been 
issued.”8  Id. ¶ 38.  Apple responded by removing the songs from 
iTunes.9  Id. ¶ 41. 
IV. The Present Action 
 
On July 25, 2013, plaintiffs filed their initial complaint 
alleging that Hartnett’s letter constituted tortious 
interference with economic advantage, tortious interference 
with contract, slander of title, defamation, and copyright 
infringement.  On June 11, 2014, plaintiffs filed their amended 
complaint, replacing the federal infringement claim with a 
claim for misrepresentation under the DMCA. 
DISCUSSION 
 
I. Pleading Standard 
On a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court must accept as true all factual 
allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences 
                                                 
8 In an affidavit, Hartnett states, without explanation, that he “drafted the 
letter in furtherance of our Florida litigation.”  Hartnett Aff. ¶ 5. 
9 On April 8, 2014, the parties stipulated to offer the songs for sale on 
iTunes, with the proceeds held in escrow.  ECF No. 11. 
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in the plaintiff’s favor.  ATSI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, 
Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 98 (2d Cir. 2007); Grandon v. Merrill Lynch 
& Co., 147 F.3d 184, 188 (2d Cir. 1998).  Nonetheless, 
“[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right of 
relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all 
of the allegations in the complaint are true.”  Bell Atl. Corp. 
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal citation 
omitted).  Ultimately, plaintiff must allege “enough facts to 
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”  Id. at 
570.  If plaintiff “ha[s] not nudged [its] claims across the 
line from conceivable to plausible, [its] complaint must be 
dismissed.”  Id.  This pleading standard applies in “all civil 
actions.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
When determining the plausibility of a complaint, the 
Court may also consider documents attached to the complaint as 
exhibits and documents incorporated by reference in the 
complaint.  Halebian v. Berv, 644 F.3d 122, 131 n.7 (2d Cir. 
2011); Chapman v. N.Y. State Div. for Youth, 546 F.3d 230, 234 
(2d Cir. 2008). 
II. The Statute 
 
Congress enacted the DMCA in order to modernize the 
application of copyright law to the Internet and modern 
technology.  Recognizing that technology service providers are 
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often not responsible for data that pass through their systems, 
Congress created a set of safe harbors to protect service 
providers from copyright liability.  See 17 U.S.C. § 512.  
Subsections (c) and (f) are most relevant to the pending 
motion. 
Subsection (c) provides a safe harbor to certain online 
“service providers”10 whose users store infringing material.  
The most typical examples arise when a company “provid[es] 
server space for a user’s web site, for a chatroom, or other 
forum in which material may be posted at the direction of 
users.”  H.R. Rep. 105-551(II), at 53 (1998). 
To qualify for the safe harbor, the service provider must 
be unaware of infringement and (in cases where the service 
provider has the right and ability to control user storage) 
must not profit directly from the infringing material.  
§ 512(c)(1).  The service provider must also designate an agent 
to receive “take-down” notices, so that copyright holders can 
notify the service provider of infringing material.  
§ 512(c)(2).  If a service provider receives such a notice, 
then the service provider must expeditiously remove the 
infringing material.  § 512(c)(1)(C). 
                                                 
10 For purposes of subsection (c), a “service provider” is “a provider of 
online services, or network access, or the operator of facilities therefor 
. . . .”  § 512(k)(1)(B).  We have no doubt that iTunes is an “online 
service[]” and Apple a “service provider.”  See, e.g., Wolk v. Kodak Imaging 
Network, Inc., 840 F. Supp. 2d 724, 744 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
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A take-down notice must contain certain elements before a 
service provider is required to remove infringing material.  
These include a signature of the copyright holder, a statement 
that the complaining party believes that use of the material is 
unauthorized, and a statement under penalty of perjury that the 
complaining party is authorized to act on behalf of the rights-
holder.  § 512(c)(3)(A)(i), (v), (vi). 
A take-down notice may lack these elements and still 
trigger at least some response on the part of its recipient.  
If the notice (1) “[i]dentifi[es] . . . the copyrighted work” 
or a “representative list of [copyrighted] works,” (2) 
“[i]dentifi[es] . . . the material that is claimed to be 
infringing,” and (3) provides adequate contact information, 
then the service provider must “promptly attempt[] to contact 
the person making the notification” to cure whichever other 
elements may be missing.  § 512(c)(3)(A)(ii)–(iv), (B)(ii). 
At the same time that Congress created this and other safe 
harbors for technology companies, Congress created a private 
cause of action, with costs and attorneys’ fees, in favor of a 
true copyright owner who is injured by “[a]ny person who 
knowingly materially misrepresents under this section” “that 
material or activity is infringing” “as the result of [a] 
service provider relying upon such misrepresentation in 
removing or disabling access to the material.”  § 512(f)(1). 
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III. The Present Motion 
Defendants make two distinct arguments: 
1) The DMCA makes a misrepresentation actionable only when 
a person makes the misrepresentation “under this 
section.”  § 512(f).  This means that the notice 
containing the misrepresentation must have complied 
substantially with the elements listed in subparagraph 
512(c)(3)(A), or else no federal action is available.  
Here, defendants’ notice to Apple failed to comply 
substantially those elements, so plaintiffs’ DMCA claim 
fails. 
2) The DMCA makes a misrepresentation actionable only when 
a person makes the misrepresentation “under this 
section.”  § 512(f).  This means that the notice 
containing the misrepresentation must have been directed 
towards infringement “by reason of the storage at the 
direction of a user,” § 512(c)(1), or else no federal 
action is available.  Here, no music was stored on 
iTunes at the direction of a user (in particular, not at 
plaintiffs’ direction), so plaintiffs’ DMCA claim fails. 
We turn initially to defendants’ first theory, and hold 
that a plaintiff may state a claim under subsection 512(f) even 
if the notice containing the alleged misrepresentation is, to 
some extent, technically deficient under subsection 512(c).  We 
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conclude that Hartnett’s communication was not so deficient as 
to fall outside the reach of subsection 512(f). 
We then turn to defendants’ second theory, and hold that a 
plaintiff may not state a claim under subsection 512(f) if the 
notice containing the alleged misrepresentation is not directed 
at “storage at the direction of a user.”  We cannot, however, 
decide at this stage whether iTunes actually stores music “at 
the direction of a user,” and therefore cannot grant the motion 
to dismiss. 
A. A Misrepresentation Claim Under the DMCA May Be 
Predicated on a Technically Defective Take-Down 
Notice. 
A false take-down notice can be actionable under 
subsection 512(f) even if the notice is technically deficient.  
The more technical requirements of paragraph 512(c)(3) are 
intended to protect the service provider, not to protect 
individuals who intentionally make false demands.  See Brave 
New Films 501(c)(4) v. Weiner, 62 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1018 
(N.D. Cal. 2009).  If we held otherwise, then a person could 
submit a slightly deficient take-down notice with impunity.11  
At best, from the perspective of person submitting the false 
notice, the service provider would choose to overlook the 
technical defect and comply with the false take-down notice.  
                                                 
11 For example, the complaining party could omit the phrase “under penalty of 
perjury” from his statement that he is authorized to act on behalf of the 
copyright owner.  See § 512(c)(3)(A)(vi). 
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At worst, the service provider would simply ignore the notice 
or request that the submitter cure the technical defect.  
Either way, under defendant’s reading of the statute, the lying 
notifier would be immune from the liability (including 
attorneys’ fees) that Congress wished to impose upon him.  The 
words “under this section” cannot render subsection 512(f) so 
toothless. 
At some point, a take-down notice may be so deficient that 
it is utterly unrecognizable as a take-down notice and 
therefore does not constitute a representation “under this 
section.”  This occurs when a purported take-down notice fails 
to substantially comply with elements 512(c)(3)(A)(ii) through 
(iv), because a notification that fails to satisfy these three 
elements carries no legal effect.12  This conclusion is 
consistent with Twelve Inches Around Corp. v. Cisco Systems, 
Inc., where the court declined to apply subsection 512(f) to a 
take-down notice alleging trademark infringement on the grounds 
that element (iii) requires a DMCA take-down notice to identify 
a copyrighted work.  No. 08-cv-6896 (WHP), 2009 WL 928077 at 
*3–4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2009). 
                                                 
12 As described above, these elements require that a take-down notice 
identify certain basic information: the copyrighted work, the infringing 
material, and the complaining party’s contact information.  
§ 512(c)(3)(A)(ii)–(iv).  If a take-down notice substantially complies with 
these three elements, then the service provider must take some action so 
that the complaining party may cure any other, more technical, defects.  See 
§ 512(c)(3)(B)(ii). 
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Here, plaintiffs have adequately pleaded that Hartnett’s 
communication substantially complied with elements (ii) through 
(iv).  Regardless of whether Hartnett used Apple’s online form 
or sent a letter (presumably on his own letterhead),13 it is 
plausible that Hartnett provided Apple with his contact 
information (element (iv)).  Furthermore, it is evident that 
Apple received sufficient information to remove the disputed 
songs from iTunes, making it plausible that Hartnett identified 
the disputed material and its location on iTunes (elements (ii) 
and (iii)). 
B. A Misrepresentation Claim Under the DMCA Must Be 
Predicated on a Take-Down Notice That Is Not Directed 
Towards Activity that the DMCA Protects. 
A false take-down notice can be actionable under 
subsection 512(f) only when the notice is directed at activity 
protected by federal law.  As to this point, we are in complete 
agreement with Rock River, 2011 WL 1598916 at *16, 2011 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 46023 at *41, which held that a take-down notice 
was “not a notification pursuant to the DMCA” when the notice 
did not complain of infringement “by reason of the storage at 
the direction of a user.”  There is simply no reason for the 
DMCA to concern itself with a person who does not abuse the 
federal rights and remedies of section 512.  Thus, we must 
                                                 
13 Plaintiffs should clarify, at some point before the next motions, whether 
Hartnett allegedly sent a letter or submitted an online form. 
Case 1:13-cv-05200-NRB   Document 28   Filed 03/26/15   Page 15 of 22
   
 16
examine whether iTunes falls within the scope of subsection 
512(c)’s safe harbor. 
C. We Cannot Decide at the Present Stage Whether Apple 
Stores Music on iTunes “at the Direction of a User.” 
The key question before us is whether Apple stores music 
on iTunes “at the direction of a user,” 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1).  
If so, then Hartnett’s communication was actionable under the 
DMCA; if not, then plaintiffs must proceed on their state-law 
causes of action. 
Defendants argue that subsection 512(c) applies only to 
service providers who allow users to upload their own content 
independent of the service provider’s intervention.  Key 
examples are YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter, each of which 
freely allows individuals to register and post content.  Unlike 
these “social media” companies, Apple does not allow ordinary 
users to sell their own content on iTunes at will.  To support 
this argument, defendants cite several provisions in the Apple 
Contract, including those that recite that iTunes is “owned 
and/or controlled by iTunes,” § 1.1(m), that Apple may use the 
licensed music “as reasonably necessary or desirable,” 
§ 2(a)(v), that Apple may sell the content in the format it 
believes to be most favorable for sales, § 3(b), and that Apple 
has wide discretion as to how to promote music on iTunes, 
§ 9(b).  Defendants also rely on Rock River, where the District 
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Court held at summary judgment that iTunes was outside the 
scope of subsection 512(c). 
Plaintiffs argue that Apple does not choose what content 
is available for sale on iTunes, emphasizing that music can 
appear on iTunes only because users (such as plaintiffs) have 
authorized Apple to sell songs on iTunes.  See Apple Contract 
§ 3(b).  Plaintiffs also cite the stipulation between Guerra 
and Karen as evidence that users have control over whether 
Apple sells music on iTunes, and plaintiffs suggest that 
Apple’s editorial control is limited in practice because of the 
large number of songs available on iTunes.  Plaintiffs 
distinguish Rock River on the grounds that the facts regarding 
Apple’s administration of iTunes were undisputed in that case. 
First, we believe that the Apple Contract does not settle 
the question of whether Guerra’s music was stored on iTunes at 
Apple’s or plaintiffs’ direction.  It is not clear who (if 
anyone) exercised discretion in selecting music for sale on 
iTunes once the Apple Contract was signed.  On the one hand, 
the Apple Contract requires plaintiffs to deliver their entire 
catalog (with limited exceptions) for sale on iTunes.  § 3(a).  
On the other hand, the contract may be fairly interpreted to 
require Apple to sell all of plaintiffs’ music (perhaps within 
commercially reasonable limits) outside of the limited 
circumstances in which the contract explicitly permits Apple to 
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remove plaintiffs’ music from iTunes.  § 6(c), (d).  The 
contract thus constrained both Apple’s and plaintiffs’ 
discretion as to whether to post songs to iTunes. 
To the extent that the Apple Contract is relevant at all 
to our analysis, it cuts somewhat in plaintiffs’ favor.  
Although the contract required plaintiffs to deliver to Apple 
every song that plaintiffs had the rights to deliver, the 
contract also assigned plaintiffs the duty to determine whether 
they possessed the appropriate distribution rights.  See Apple 
Contract §§ 15(b), 17(b).  This suggests that, to the extent 
that any selection occurred, it was plaintiffs who selected 
songs for sale on the basis of their own distribution rights. 
Second, it may be the case that a service stores material 
“at the direction of a user” even when the service provider 
reserves broad legal rights to control how that material is 
presented and whether that material appears at all.  For 
example, defendants Google’s YouTube video service is a service 
within the scope of subsection 512(c).  See Def. Reply Bf. 6, 
ECF No. 27 (citing YouTube as an example of a service that 
qualifies for § 512(c)); Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 
676 F.3d 19, 38–40 (2d Cir. 2012).  But even Google retains 
absolute discretion to remove content from YouTube.  See Terms 
of Service ¶¶ 6(F), 7(B), https://www.youtube.com/static? 
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template=terms (dated June 9, 2010; last visited Mar. 11, 
2015). 
The proper question is not whether Apple has the legal 
right to control how music appears on iTunes (as it surely 
does), but rather the degree to which, as a practical matter, 
Apple actually exercises its rights by organizing plaintiffs’ 
music on iTunes manually or deciding how to promote plaintiffs’ 
music. 
The presence of some automated processing in between when 
plaintiffs upload music and when the music appears on iTunes 
for sale is not enough to take iTunes outside the scope of 
subsection 512(c).  For example, in Io Group, Inc. v. Veoh 
Networks, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1146 (N.D. Cal. 2008), 
the court considered uploads to the defendant’s online video 
site to be “at the direction of a user” even though the 
defendant’s software automatically processed the user’s file to 
some degree.  Likewise, YouTube is protected by subsection 
512(c) even though Google itself adapts user-submitted videos 
into “thumbnail” clips that Google then displays next to other 
videos that Google’s computed algorithm deems to be related.”  
See Viacom, 676 F.3d at 39–40.  As the Second Circuit 
explained, processed user-submitted media are considered to be 
stored at the direction of users so long as the processing “‘is 
closely related to, and follows from the storage itself,” and 
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is ‘narrowly directed toward providing access to material 
stored at the direction of users.’”  Id. at 40 (quoting UMG 
Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 620 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 
1092 (C.D. Cal. 2008).  Indeed, this conclusion holds even when 
the service provider assigns a human being to perform light-
weight screening or processing of user-submitted files.  See 
Costar Grp. Inc. v. Loopnet, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 2d 688, 702 
(D. Md. 2001) (photographs were stored at direction of users 
even though service provider’s employees screened photos to 
assess whether photos portrayed real estate). 
Under this test, it is possible that the music on iTunes 
could be stored at the direction of users or at the direction 
of Apple. 
On the one hand, it is possible that, despite having a 
legal right to control iTunes, Apple typically allows music 
distributors (including plaintiffs) to post music to iTunes 
without any intervention by Apple, except perhaps a fully or 
mostly automated process to format, encrypt, and catalog files 
for sale. 
However, it is also possible that Apple routinely takes 
some initiative in deciding which songs appear on iTunes and 
how those songs appear.  Apple advertises some songs 
prominently, offers customers free samples whose lengths differ 
for different songs, prices different songs in different ways, 
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and prevents customers from buying some songs [à la carte].  
Even these functions would not negate the “storage at the 
direct of users” element if Apple performs these functions in a 
systematic, automated way for the purpose of “help[ing] 
customers locate and gain access to material stored at the 
direction of other users.”  Viacom, 676 F.3d at 40.  But if 
Apple routinely performs material, discretionary, manual 
functions on incoming songs, then iTunes may well fall outside 
the ambit of subsection 512(c).14 
In sum, the complaint simply does not state enough facts 
about iTunes for us to say what happens behind the scenes, so 
we cannot decide at the present stage whether iTunes stores 
music at the direction of users. 
CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we deny defendants’ motion.  As 
we discussed in a telephone conference with the parties on 
February 23, 2015, the parties should proceed to discovery on 
the limited question of whether a distinctly federal claim is 
viable under subsection 512(f). 
 
                                                 
14 We wish to express no disagreement at this stage with Rock River’s 
conclusion that Apple directs files to iTunes.  However, at this pleading 
stage, we lack the full discovery record that was available to the District 
Judge in that case at summary judgment.  If the record here bears out the 
same facts, we may well come to the same conclusion. 
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Dated: New York, New York 
March -zb , 2015 
,L~~c~ 
NAOMI REICE BUCHWALD 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
Copies of the foregoing Memorandum and Order have been mailed 
on this date to the following: 
Attorney for Plaintiffs: 
Neil J. Saltzman, Esq. 
P.O. Box 299 
Bronx, NY 10471 
Attorney for Defendants: 
Chauncey D. Cole IV, Esq. 
Kozyak Tropin Throckmorton, P.A. 
2525 Ponce De Leon Boulevard, 9th Floor 
Miami, FL 33134 
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